Abstract -Malware is an international software disease. Research shows that the effect of malware is becoming chronic. To protect against malware detectors are fundamental to the industry. The effectiveness of such detectors depends on the technology used. Therefore, it is paramount that the advantages and disadvantages of each type of technology are scrutinized analytically. This study's aim is to scrutinize existing publications on this subject and to follow the trend that has taken place in the advancement and development with reference to the amount of information and sources of such literature. Many of the malware programs are huge and complicated and it is not easy to comprehend the details. Dissemination of malware information among users of the Internet and also training them to correctly use anti-malware products are crucial to protecting users from the malware onslaught. This paper will provide an exhaustive bibliography of methods to assist in combating malware.
INTRODUCTION
Computers and information technologies (IT) have played a major role in the advancement of the last twenty years, Computer-based crimes using mal ware involve personal computers, private information of users which could be 'sensitive', network infrastructure, mobile platforms, and other internet based programs. Malware development is on the increase and enables an attack on much of a user's information without distinction. Malware has had a tremendous impact on the world, as we know it. Since 1988 [1, 2] the increase in the number of computer based security breaches confirms that malicious software has reached almost unmanageable levels. Taking into consideration the extent of potential damage caused by malicious software, its detection alone has caused significant problems for both the investigators and general population. Detection systems created by investigators are regularly put to extensive use in detection exercises. This paper is dedicated to researching malicious software detection methodologies.
A. Research Motivation
The structure of malware analysis and services has become an even more attractive target for potential attackers. A sequential methodology reveals the makeup of the malicious software and the way it operates. During analysis a critical procedure called 'behavior monitoring' is employed using "dynamic coarsegrained binary instrumentation" on the target system. 'Profiling' [3] is the terminology used to describe the first collection of malicious software for investigation. A malicious software detection system itself can be a target for attack -the confidentiality, integrity, availability of its information bank, data and the virtualized infrastructure could be used by the malware to initiate fresh onslaughts on the detector system. The situation would become virtually unmanageable if a powerful computing system, with a huge storage volume, were attacked by internal malware.
On January 7,2014 Fox IT, which is headquartered in Holland, published a report stating that many Yahoo.com visitors were corrupted via Java exploit. The advertising arm of Yahoo -Ads.Yahoo.com -had been compromised and a virus broadcast to their users. It was estimated by Fox IT that by December 30, almost 300,000 users per hour were affected by the virus, with approximately 27,000 suffering serious consequences. In this instance, Yahoo's advertising system was transmitting a so-called 'exploit kit'. Fox IT determined that the 'exploit kit' would focus on weaknesses in the Java program to exploit and download all types of malicious software programs on the user's computer. The malware supplier has yet to be detected, but it is speculated that they may have made large financial gains via selling information from the affected systems to third parties [4, 5] . Due to the need for absolute control over the system structure, the ability to detect malicious software has been greatly affected. Absolute control plays a significant part in safeguarding surfers' data in the Internet environment. This paper collates the problems faced by experts in preventing the development of mal ware in the Internet industry. An attempt is made to pull together the resources experts use and consolidate the fragmented work that is currently being done so that a robust and concerted effort can be made to combat the proliferation of malicious software. This concerted effort will focus on developing the required detection technology.
B. Research Boundaries and Limitations
"Multi-purpose" detection systems -which are more comprehensive in their functions -are being considered and proposed in this research. In an attempt to reduce false-positive rates, a number of researchers are concentrating on a dedicated detection process path to narrow down on a particular type of malicious code.
Since malicious software detection is the key focus ofthis paper, much concentration is being put on recent updated literature and systems. The result of studies is based on the taxonomy of malware as explained in the following section. Irrespective of the extent to which the science and technology of mal ware detection has progressed, this paper has based its investigations on the following research questions:
RQ1. What requirements should malicious software detectors comply with to be effective?
RQ2.
What is the taxonomy of the mal ware detection technique?
RQ3.
What are the strengths and weaknesses of existing solutions for malware detection?
II. MAL W ARE DETECTION SYSTEM DEFINITIONS AND TAXONOMY
'Mal' in the Spanish language means 'bad'. 'Malware' is described by other terms such as malicious software, malicious code, or malcode. The following definitions represent the different explanation of mal ware by some of the researchers. a) Malware's intention is to be destructive [6] . b) Malicious code is any code introduced into a system to sabotage the system [7] . c) 'Malware' is a specific name used for a category of software codes that is malicious. This would include "Viruses, Worms, Trojans, and Spywares" ( Most other malicious programs, including: logic bombs -that look like legal programs but malign the actual program; rootkits -that consist of tools for Others hacking and also malign the proper operation of any sot1:ware; backdoor -a term used to describe a process that prevents or interferes with the authorized operation of a system.
The concept of a 'computer virus' takes its name from a fictional science based novel where a computer program named "virus" was able to mutate. In the educational field it was used by Cohen in his thesis "Experiments with Computer Viruses" [10] however, literature on viruses can be found earlier than Cohen's first usage. Apple II computers were among the first to be attacked by viruses in 1981 and 1982. The first recorded incidence of a virus was called Elk Cloner in mid-1981. This was followed by 'Brain' in 1986, a boot sector virus.
Science fiction also gave birth to ' Worm', this name was first used by John Brunner who wrote the novel 'Shockwave Rider' to depict a program that broadcasts itself on a network. But Shoch says he was the first to introduce the term in the academia [11] .
A. Organization of Malware Detection
Malicious software detection is split in two ways: Signature-and Behavior-based technologies and each technology can be used with static, dynamic or hybrid analysis [12] . The particular methodology for an anomaly-or signature-based procedure is based on how the technology collates the information to detect malicious software [13] [14] [15] . How malicious software detection is managed is shown in Fig. 1 . 
Malwal'e detection
Procedures employed for detecting malicious software can be summarized into two parts:
A. Anomaly-Based Detection
An anomaly-based detection draws upon its information base to determine the presence of normal behavior to decide the strength of the mal ware under investigation. Another form of anomaly-based detection could be called specification-based detection. Anomaly-based detection investigation takes places in two situations:
• A training or learning situation. While in the training situation the detector tries to learn the normal behavior. It is quite possible that the detector is learning the host's behavior or the PUI's or maybe both combined. The main benefit of the anomaly-based detection is its capability to detect zero-day intrusions.
• A detection or monitoring situation.
The two essential drawbacks of this procedure are:
• High false alarm rates: It is prone to excessive false alarm rates, which is defined as 'normal' outputs categorized as (false positive) and divided by the total number of 'normal' behavior.
• The difficulty in ensuring what parameters need to be learned in the training situation.
a) Specification-Based Detection
To deal with high false alarm incidence that goes with many anomaly-based detection procedures, a specification-based detection, which is similar to an anomaly-based unit, is utilized. Due to the fact that specification-based detection is derived from anomalybased detection, it is used to estimate the requirements for a system, rather than trying to estimate the execution of an end-use for a system. Moreover, in specification-based detection the training situation is the guideline, which dictates or forecasts all outcomes that any behavior of a program may show for that particular system being safeguarded or under investigation. The major drawback of specificationbased detection is that it is not easy to predict all the acceptable outcomes fully and precisely that a system will manifest.
B. Signature-Based Detection
Signature-based detection utilizes its technologybased personality to discern a mal ware and consequently confirm the malevolent nature of a program under investigation. Putting it another way, the signature-based detection tries to create a benchmark using the mal ware and subsequently uses this as a reference for detecting other malicious software.
In grouping all these models, the signature-based detection generates a database for itself. In a perfect system, it is imperative that the signature should recognize any program manifesting a behavior fitting the signature's malicious database. This database contains all information needed by the signature to detect malicious software. This database is consulted whenever there is a potential problem with the PUI.
One of the main problems of the signature-based detection method is its inability to recognize 'zeroday' intrusions. A zero-day intrusion is a situation where there is no similar signature in the database to compare with. Also an experienced person is probably needed to design the signature. Aside from giving way to operator error it is a tedious process if the design and installation is not set up to function automatically. Due to the fact that certain mal ware is able to proliferate the ability to design and install a more precise signature is extremely critical. Developers of such signatures, which function on an automatic mode, could be found without much effort, but significantly more energy needs to be put in to doing this. However, all detection procedures could use one of three vanous methodologies.
• Static: As in language, static analysis uses the structure or formatting of the programming to uncover the mal ware under investigation. Generally, a static methodology strives to uncover mal ware prior to the program under investigation being implemented.
• Dynamic: During pre-or post-program implementation malware can be detected utilizing a dynamic methodology.
• Hybrid: Hybrid procedures are available which combines the two methodologies, meaning both static and dynamic databases are used to uncover malicious software.
III. MALWARE DETECTOR
As set out in the introduction, a malicious software detector is a device that uses technology to detect mal ware. The function of the detector is to recognize malevolent software using signatures and other problem solving skills. One example of a detector is for instance, an antivirus scanner. Malware detectors are the first line of defense in combating viruses. Its function is to safeguard the system against any intrusion. The detector could be located in the host or outside. The detection system functions via the established technology and performs an observed evaluation of malware detecting skills [15, 16] . The efficacy of a similar detector depends on the skills it possesses.
There are dual inputs to any malware detector. The first such output is its ability to recognize the mal ware in question. In anomaly-based detection the detector has less information in the initial phase of its operation and gains in confidence at the top of the learning curve.
Therefore, a deviant behavior could easily be detected by an anomaly-based detection system due to its skills [17] . Due to the inherent nature of the detection system any deviant behavior is assumed to be malevolent and is therefore captured by the anomaly-based detector. If the detector is of a signature-based type, its reaction is triggered by its memory base. This memory base is usually brought up to currency by designated people who are able to recognize mal ware and manifest it in a format acceptable to the signature database and eventually readable by the relevant equipment [18, 19] .
The malware detector has to have another input and that is the program under investigation. The moment the detector knows what it terms as malevolent behavior (normal behavior) and the program under investigation, it will call upon its database to consider whether the program is malevolent or not.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The authors [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] have recommended that for the purpose of writing a literature review paper the following method be adopted to source material for reVIew:
The beginning stage for the review should include the doctoral research papers from universities around the world since they have been scrutinized at higher levels. Online libraries have often been the resource centers for postgraduate research. "Malware" and "malware analysis" are keywords that have been utilized to relate to various theses for research. The next stage should include journals and papers presented at forums worldwide since these have been vetted by people possessing expertise in the field and have been accepted for publications or discussions.
The list of research papers (from serial number Ill) and theses (from serial number 12-18) included in the review and their classifications with respect to their topics and contributions have been summarized in Table III 2013) of differentiating worm and virus biometrics. In addition, "aligned signature [29] .
sequences" can be excavated by means of preset excavation processes to obtain future biometrics that will aid to differentiate between worm and virus signatures.
An approach for detection and This study tackles the problem of analyzing, detecting and classifying the vast 2 family classification of S. S. Hansen, amount of mal ware in a scalable, efficient and accurate manner. They propose a mal ware based on behavioral etal.(2016) novel approach tor detecting malware and classifying it to either known or analysis [30] .
novel.
Method and apparatus for Gu, Guofei, The invention generally relates to network security, and 3 detecting mal ware infection present more [31] . et al. (2015) particularly relates to the detection of mal ware intection. (2013) can be automatically detected and suppressed with these systems.
Khalid In this research a new technique that defeats the downside of current malicious
Malware Variant Detection Mohamed software detection processes was postulated by examining the meaning of 12 [39] . Abdelrahman known malware codes. The procedures involve three significant investigation Y Alzarooni techniques: "the proposing ofa semantic signature", "slicing analysis", and "test (2012) data generation analysis".
The aims of this thesis are to develop effective and efficient methodologies, 13
Detection and Classification Tian (2011) which can be applied to continuously improve the performance of detection and System [40] . classification on malware collected over an extended period of time.
Roberto
This group proposed a new architecture for enhancing behavior based 14 Dealing with next generation Paleari investigation of dubious programs that affords the end-user to entrust security Malware [41] .
(2011 ) labs with the implementation and investigation of a program and to coerce the program to acquit itself as though it was implemented by the end-user.
Robust & Efficient Malware Monirull. 1) Efficient Methods for enabling static malware analysis. 2) Making dynamic 15
Analysis and host based Sharif (20 10) analysis approaches more robust. 3) Reversing emulator based obfuscation. 4) monitoring [42] .
Anticipating obfuscations that hide trigger based behavior.
16
Data mining methods For Siddiqui The author postulated a data-extraction architecture to detect malware. malware detection [14] .
Behavioral and Structural Christopher In this thesis, approaches to distinguish behavioral and structural properties of
17
Properties of Malicious Code Kruegel binary codes were postulated. These approaches could be utilized to produce [44] . (2007) nebulous, and meaningful accounts of malicious software and to distinctively classify malware in lieu of isolated happenings.
v.
MALWARE DETECTION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
The system requirements for malware detection are as follows:
should be able to be upgraded regularly to accommodate every conceivable malevolent activity with relatively few false-positive alarms.
The design has to have a pre-agreed performance level and also be secure and should require the minimum computation assets because computational potential affects the effectiveness of cloud services. Hence, the effectiveness of such capabilities should be harnessed to manage false positive alarms while ensuring an acceptable level of detection performance.
RI. Detect Variety of Attacks with Least False Positive Rates
The proliferation of computer intrusions, with increasing intricacies and unforeseen circumstances means it is imperative for the system to identify new intrusions and their predatory designs in order to select the appropriate preemptive strategy.
The requirement is that the system should be teachable and be able to be learnt. Also the system
R2. Super-Fast Detection and Prevention
Extremely quick detection and prevention is very critical for efficient detection of mal ware because it affects the complete system performance and is also critical to supply serVIce previously agreed upon (QoS).
R3. Malware Detection System Scalability
Any good mal ware detection system should be expandable so that it can manage the huge number of network nodes that could be free in cyberspace and their communication and computational burden. The inclusion of a detection and correlation manager also has a bearing on the expandability and performance of mal ware detection systems. It is a critical central requirement for malware systems, which limits the basic infrastructure ability to changing demands such as the quantity and magnitude of data used in applications.
R4. Resistance to Compromise
In estimating its own assessment and preservation in the event it is affected by an attacker, a malware detection system must shield itself from rouge infiltration. A malware detection system should have the ability to approve normal behavior and responds abnormal behavior.
VI. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EXISTING MAL W ARE DETECTION TECHNIQUES
There are pros and cons of such detection methods which need to be compared in order to evaluate and make objective decisions for each situation. In the previous section ofthis research it was pointed out that attacks could happen due to a flaw in the system. When an intrusion is detected an alarm ensues. How well the system detects an intrusion depends on the preciseness and currency of the database. The more current the knowledge of the database the lower the rate of false alarms. In addition, the environmental analysis, as postulated by the malicious software, is comprehensive and therefore it is possible to take corrective steps. However, this approach runs into some problems, namely, the continuity of the mal ware detection database updating periodically, the fact that it is very focused and hence lack of peripheral vision, and lastly, to detect intrusion from internal sources.
Regarding the next option, the behavior-based procedure is a standard procedure obtained from published information. Any ongoing program is referenced against this standard procedure and any variance is considered a malicious intrusion. This methodology can detect attempted intrusions into unsuspecting victims and may be able to uncover new onslaughts before they occur. Though, it may not affect so much the available technical databases, it will help to protect misuse of privileged information or information that possesses certain rights or immunity. It has, however, two drawbacks: firstly, the high incidence of false alarms and secondly, that it requires online retraining from time to time. This could result in additional exposure to attacks to the detection system or false alarms (Table IV) 
DISCUSSION
In spite of the fact that there are two significant methodologies in place for the analysis of malicious software, there is a shortcoming in the application due to a vast spectrum of scenarios that allow mal ware to go undetected.
In answer to the first research question (RQ 1. What requirements should malicious software detectors comply with to be used effectively?) a list of essentials was assembled (in Section V) with reference to the attributes of malicious software detection systems. In addition, in Section II, the current classification of malicious software detection methodologies into groups is discussed to elicit a response to the second research question (RQ2. What is taxonomy of mal ware detection technique?). In response to the third question (RQ3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of existing solutions to mal ware detection?) a list of the advantages and disadvantages that meet the list of mal ware detection techniques are discussed (in Section VI).
VIII. CONCLUSION
This research enumerated a detailed classification of first class malicious software detection and avoidance programs for researchers to 'bite into'. Dedicated importance was assigned to malicious software requirements and recognition given to the essentials of malware detection and avoidance procedures. 
